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Abstract
When deviance becomes sin
In this article a brief exposition is given o f what sin and deviance entail. This 
perspective is approached in terms o f what is called the logovision premise. This 
premise essentially maintains that human perception o f reality is primarily 
mediated through words and that only God’s words allow us to see reality as it 
truly is.
Thus we are enabled to respond appropriately to reality -  especially evaluative 
reality. By then applying God’s words to the issues involved in the study of 
deviance, more clarity is hopefully achieved. This is done by discussing the 
respective characteristics o f sin and deviance and by briefly exploring the 
relationship between these two phenomena. Finally some o f the implications for 
the study o f social deviance are discussed.
1. Introduction
Accepting the category of sin as ontologically real, is of course only possible if 
one accepts the Christian worldview, as presented in the Bible, as valid. This 
will be my point of departure in discussing the topic “When deviance becomes 
sin”.
Another important premise from which this theme will be discussed, will be 
called the logovision (from the words logos and vision) premise and can be 
summarized in five statements:
•  We look at reality with our eyes but we see reality through words. This is a 
very simple but profound truth that has been captured long ago in Walter 
Lipman’s aphorism: “First we look, then we name and only then we see” 
(Bredemeier & Stephenson, 1962:2).
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• What we thus see in reality, is -  i f  we believe the words applied to that reality
-  taken by us as basis fo r  our reaction or response to that reality.
• I f  deceptive words about reality were used and we believed those words, we 
would not see reality as it really is, i.e. true reality, but we would take the 
false reality to be the true reality.
•  I f  we have thus been successfully deceived, i.e. convinced to believe the false 
reality (lie) to be the true reality (truth) our response to that reality could be 
fatally inappropriate. For example, if A wanted to kill B, A could simply 
invite B to have a can of Coke after having added poison in the can but 
without having changed the word “Coke” on the can to the word “Poison”. B 
would then see a can of Coke on the basis of having believed the word 
“Coke” written on the tin and would inappropriately respond by drinking the 
“Coke” and die -  having taken a false reality (a lie) to be the true reality 
(truth) and having done so with fatal consequences.
• As Ultimate Definitional Authority, G od’s Words about reality - be it 
physical, psychological, socio-cultural or spiritual reality -  are the words 
that, i f  accepted and believed, can guide human words and systems o f words
-  also social scientific words and word systems -  as well as human actions, 
towards a much closer encounter with truth than would otherwise have been 
humanly possible.
Against the backdrop of these remarks, then, this article is written with the 
primary aim of bringing more clarity in the evaluative confusion which is 
characteristic o f the study of social deviance and which in this article is seen as 
the result of unsuccessful attempts at evading inescapable evaluative issues. It is 
attempted to obtain more clarity by bringing God’s words to bear on the 
confusion in the study of deviance so as to attempt to see the realities concerning 
deviance, more clearly. This is done by distinguishing between sin and social 
deviance and by relating these phenomena to each other.
2. On good and evil
Cherbonnier starts his discussion on the interconnectedness between sin and the 
evaluative issues of good and evil as follows:
Anyone who uses the word ‘sin’ obviously assumes a distinction between good 
and evil. But leaders of thought, both scientific and philosophic have 
frequently challenged this distinction. A discussion of sin must therefore first 
deal with the question of whether in the last analysis, the difference between 
good and evil is tenable or whether it is merely a subjective phenomenon 
which a man of intelligence can overcome. If it can be successfully suppressed, 
then all talk about sin becomes a dead issue. But if not, then sin at once 
becomes everybody’s problem. H e who w ishes to a vo id  this p rob lem  correctly
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concentrates his fire upon value judgments (Cherbonnier, 1956:21; emphasis -  
AS.)
Also Berkouwer (1958:5) acknowledges this connection between sin and issues 
of good and evil when he says:
Deze vraag ... (naar de oorsprong der zonde) ... die men binnen de grenzen 
van kerk en theologie allerwegen aantreft, schijnt haar parallel te vinden in een 
algemene bezinning over de oorsprong van ‘het kwaad’ in de wereld.
The same interconnectedness is also emphasized by Moller (1997:4, 5, 6, 8, 31). 
In the following few paragraphs I will expand on this issue.
Underlying every human being’s and therefore every social scientist’s cognitive, 
emotional and volitional faculties, is the even more fundamental, evaluative 
capacity -  i.e. the formal capacity or dynamism which enables human beings to 
differentiate between good and evil or right and wrong. O f course the 
definitional content of the terms good and evil or right and wrong is to some 
extent culturally influenced. However, in the final analysis, the definitional 
content o f these evaluative opposites is determined by the particular individual’s 
free choice of an ultimate directional source or an ultimate definitional authority
-  be it him- or herself, be it some other human being or beings, be it a particular 
philosophy, or ideology, or be it a supernatural source e.g. God, Satan or other 
spirit beings. The chosen ultimate definitional authority becomes god/God to 
that person. The definitional content given or derived from the chosen ultimate 
definitional authority, will therefore not only be accepted by the particular actor, 
but the evaluative behavioural directives (values) flowing from this authoritative 
source, will also be freely obeyed.
It is important and very interesting to note that this evaluative capacity does not 
lie dormantly within us waiting to be activated only when we so desire. In actual 
fact, we can neither escape the continuous working of this capacity nor the 
continuous responsibility and accountability that goes along with the inevitable 
choices between good and evil we continuously make.
Even if we tried to escape from our evaluative capacities by professing 
evaluative neutrality or simply by remaining silent, our professed neutrality or 
silence will not only always be taken by a particular audience to signify -  even if 
only by implication -  approval of the phenomenon under scrutiny, but will in 
fact involve that approval. We therefore always make and convey evaluative 
statements -  even if only by default. If a social scientist were to try to break 
loose from this tenacious evaluative responsibility by stating: "It is wrong to be 
evaluatively involved as a social scientist” or “It is right to be evaluatively 
neutraP’ he or she would paradoxically still be making, and in fact would 
already have made an evaluative statement.
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Cherbonnier (1956:21) discusses a number of futile attempts to escape value 
judgments o f which Nietzche’s attempt is perhaps the most illustrative of the 
futility and failure of such attempts at evaluative beyondism and which suggest 
that they are in principle impossible.
No one can censor the word ‘good’ and ‘evil’ without introducing some 
substitute for them, and no one can put them in quarantine without pre­
supposing them. Even the legitimate suspension of value judgments for 
purposes of scientific investigation occurs within the total context of valuation.
The scientist must first decide that it is ‘good’ to seek objective truth. To make 
the further decision that it would be even ‘better’ to dispense completely with 
the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ would repudiate the basis of the decision itself. It is 
therefore not surprising that everyone who attempts to banish these terms 
becomes the victims of a curious irony.
In his book Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche (1956:23) failed to break free 
from making evaluative statements. Cherbonnier (1956:23) remarks in this 
regard: “The irony of his (Nietzsche’s) position however, consists in his 
denunciation of value judgments, together with those who make them, as 
themselves wicked."
The scientific commandment, "Thou shall not commit a value judgment" -  so 
eloquently opposed by Gouldner (in Finsterbusch & McKenna, 1986:15) is 
therefore a commandment to remain evaluatively silent and passive and in effect 
implies the following: “Thou shalt not disapprove of or in any way act against 
any behaviour (sociologically defined ‘sins’ like racism, sexism and classism 
excluded of course). By thy silence and inaction thou shalt be taken to be -  or 
preferably, though shalt be -  an agent o f the universal condonation o f human 
behaviour in the name o f  social science (once again of course excluding the 
trilogy of “sociological sins” of racism, sexism and classism). If saying “yes” to 
evil, or consciously remaining silent about it while being aware of its existence, 
involves condoning that wrong, then saying “no” to evil, automatically becomes 
one of the most powerful statements any human being can make.
To summarize: All human beings -  and therefore all social scientists -  are bom 
with an evaluative capacity to differentiate between good and evil; possess the 
ability and freedom to define the contents of good and evil in terms of a chosen 
directional source or ultimate definitional authority, are free to choose or decide 
between these evaluative opposites -  once again in terms of a chosen directional 
source or ultimate definitional authority and finally, are responsible for the 
actions flowing from their choice. Furthermore, human beings -  and hence 
social scientists too -  cannot break free from this evaluative capacity or the 
responsibility and accountability that goes along with it. We are therefore 
inescapably, evaluatively responsible and accountable for what we say and do, 
not by choice but because that is part o f  our being as humans. We are, however, 
also free to choose who or what we will accept and obey as ultimate definitional
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authority in our lives and work. In view of the varying and even contradictory 
definitions of what constitutes good and the varying and often contradictory 
definitions of what constitutes evil, the following question inevitably arises: 
“Which then is the truly good and which the truly evil?” There has to be a single 
answer to a question like this as two mutually exclusive and opposite answers 
cannot both simultaneously be valid and apply to a particular case and in 
particular circumstances. We therefore have no choice but to choose. As a result 
we as human beings carry a threefold burden in this regard:
• Firstly, the burden of defining good and evil, or our definitional burden or 
responsibility, which requires us to search the minefield of distorted and 
deceptive definitions of good and evil for the true good and the true evil and 
to distinguish these from the false good and the false evil respectively.
•  Secondly, the burden o f choice, or our decisional responsibility, which 
requires us to take a stand on these evaluative opposites amidst powerful 
contradicting pressures impinging on our attempt to make the right choice.
• Thirdly, the burden o f  accountability or our admissional responsibility (i.e. 
the act o f  accepting or acknowledging as true) which requires us to accept 
responsibility for our choices and the associated actions and to explain and 
justify these actions we perform when asked to account for them.
3. On deviance
3.1 Deviance and evaluative issues
When social scientists study the phenomenon o f social deviance they are in 
terms of the above therefore subject to conflicting forces: One the one hand the 
scientific commandment o f value or ethical neutrality and on the other hand the 
inevitability o f being evaluatively responsible and accountable. In a futile 
attempt to give precedence to the former, they often respond as follows: Instead 
of calling certain forms of behaviour bad, wrong or evil, they opt for ostensibly 
more neutral or scientific sounding terms like ‘deviant’, ‘pathological’, 
‘disorganized’ etc. “Good” behaviour is then referred to as for example 
‘conforming’ ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ and ‘organized’ behaviour. Lyman (1978: 
129) remarks in this regard:
Through the bloodless language of the new sciences the sins are neutralized: 
Sloth becomes ‘affectlessness’; lust changes to ‘sexual deviance’; envy shows 
up as ‘resentment’; greed reforms itself as the ‘spirit of capitalism’; gluttony 
fades into ‘addiction’, and pride is reduced to ‘mental illness’. Anger, however, 
resists the expurgations of scientific and lexical sublimation; typically, we fmd 
it characterized as ‘aggression’.
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A sinister and dangerous dynamic, however, is operating within and underlying 
this whole process and that is what could be called the dynamic of the polar 
transpositioning o f  evaluative opposites. This involves the tendency towards 
calling good “evil” and calling evil “good” so as to get people, in terms of 
logovision premise -  whether they are God’s children or not -  to see a false 
reality as though it were the true reality in order to get them to act in a fatally 
inappropriate manner. The polar transpositioning o f evaluative opposites 
normally manifests itself in the following three phases and /or dimensions:
The first phase very often simply involves a questioning of the validity of the 
distinction between good and evil, light and darkness, truth and lie, love and 
hate, in a particular case which at the same time represents a symbolic 
questioning of the generic validity of the distinction between evaluative 
opposites in all similar cases. It invariably takes the form of the questioning, 
discrediting, debunking, incredulizing and attacking the “good” pole of the 
evaluative continuum. Questions like the following are examples of this: “Can 
we really know what is good, what is right, what is truth, what is light, what is 
loveT’ Eventually God becomes the target of this process as is indicated by the 
following question which Móller (1997:10) sees as manifestation of the de­
structive dynamic of sin: “How do we know whether God is not perhaps evil 
rather than good, and whether He is not perhaps seeking our doom instead of our 
salvation or survival?”
Implied in questions like these is the suggestion that what is called “good/right/ 
truth/light/love” is not nearly as distinct and different from its evaluative 
opposites as we might think. Strangely, nobody seems to have a problem to 
recognize and acknowledge the distinct characteristics of the evaluative 
opposites of evil, wrong, the lie, darkness, and hate.
The second phase frequently amounts to an attempt to diminish the distance 
between or blur the clarity of the distinction between good and evil by 
emphasizing apparent commonalities between the evaluative opposites and then 
concluding with the question: “Are these apparent opposites really so 
different?” -  thus in effect making evil less objectionable and good less 
attractive. This dynamic is very often observable in televised situational 
comedies.
Thirdly and finally, a transpositioning of evaluative opposites very often occurs 
where -  and here the evil pole o f the continuum receives the emphasis and 
becomes the benefactor -  evil is being called good, particularly by means of the 
names given to it. Thus, for instance, crime can became “innovation”; adultery 
“swinging”, prostitution “sexual therapy” or “commercial sex work”, theft 
“redistribution of wealth”, etc. Taken to its logical extreme, this phase tends to 
find its conclusion in calling God Satan and calling Satan God. Interestingly 
enough, this is exactly what Satan implied when he tried to convince Eve to
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obey him rather than God. The dire consequences of this is to be found in the 
behavioural correlates which go with this polar transpositioning -  i.e. the 
growing tolerance and approval of and eventual participation in activities like 
these by increasing numbers o f people. In this way, the gradual and incremental 
and almost unnoticeable institutionalization of evil/wrong/darkness/the lie/hate 
takes effect. Being death-directed, this process, which is always Satan-driven 
through the degenerative dynamic of sin,
... (is) geared at spoiling and ultimately destroying that which God has made.
It strives to convert all that is beautiful to ugly, good to bad, true to false and to 
kill that which lives. Everything was created to the glory of God and with the 
purpose of exalting Him, but sin aims to reverse this trend, turning everything 
against God and making it a disgrace. Consequently sin always blasphemes 
God [Isa. 25:5; 1 Pet. 4:4, 14] (Moller, 1997:10).
Unless reversed -  which has of course in principle already been done two 
thousand years ago, in and through Christ Jesus -  this process inevitably would 
have to result in the ultimate destruction of humanity and society and everything 
else that exists.
Nevertheless, whatever one calls deviance, it is always implicitly suggested to 
be the kind of behaviour to be avoided, because it is considered ‘bad’, whereas 
the opposite category (i.e. conformity) is implicitly suggested to be the kind of 
behaviour to be espoused, because it is considered ‘good’. Students and other 
audiences reading works on social deviance or listening to talks on this subject, 
implicitly accept this evaluative differentiation, not only to be valid, but 
moreover, almost invariably take the evaluative behavioural directives, implied 
in theories of deviance, as guidelines for their own behaviour.
A very clear illustration that even sociologists tend to do this, can be found in 
the following remark by Alex Thio on Glaser’s theory of differential 
identification concerning criminality: “Glaser’s theory may be taken to suggest 
that it is all right for us to associate with criminals in real life or in books and 
movies, as long as we do not take them so seriously that we identify with them, 
treating them as our heroes. If we do identify with them, we are likely to become 
criminals ourselves” (Thio, 1995:35).
As social scientific human beings, sociologists (and most probably all other 
students of human behaviour as well) therefore have to deal with two types of 
knowledge concerning the social reality they study. The one type is informative 
or categorical knowledge which is always and in all contexts, in a very explicit 
sense, present and operating in all human behaviour. A pilot, hunter or 
foodgatherer respectively has to be in possession of and act in accordance with 
very distinctive sets of informative knowledge in order to fly a plane 
successfully, track down and kill some animal and find food in the fields 
necessary for survival. In the same way sociologists make use of informative
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knowledge when -  among others things -  they differentiate between deviant and 
conforming behaviour and the characteristics o f each.
The other more implicit type of knowledge, which is more fundamental than the 
first, and furthermore inseparably linked to the first, is of course evaluative or 
normative knowledge. Evaluative knowledge is nothing more and nothing less 
than knowledge of good and evil, which infuses and directs our informative 
knowledge.
With reference to the examples used above, evaluative knowledge actually 
precedes and in fact constitutes the foundation on the basis upon which the 
categorical information is considered to be of value. Because flying per se, 
flying as a means of rapid transport, safe flying etc. are defined as good (i.e. 
evaluative knowledge) therefore the knowledge to build safe and fast planes, the 
skills to fly these planes successfully, etc. (categorical knowledge), becomes, 
valued. The same line of argumentation applies to the other two and similar 
examples.
Applied to the sociological study of the field of social deviance, it therefore 
becomes possible to construct a typology, which relates the above-mentioned 




E valuative G ood  
defin itions o f
Evil
A very simple, yet fundamental, truth emerges from this typology, namely that it 
is possible to differentiate between good deviance and evil or bad deviance on 
the one hand, as well as between good conformity and evil or bad conformity on 
the other hand. This differentiation -  although found to be highly disturbing and 
unacceptable by some sociologists, e.g. Rushing and Sagarin (in Thio, 1995:5) -  
is not only logically appealing but also empirically convincing in the sense that 
all social scientists would acknowledge that not all forms of deviant behaviour
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are necessarily bad -  e.g. deviating from a peer group norm which requires the 
use of drugs -  nor that all forms of conformity are necessarily good -  e.g. 
conforming to the dictates of a totalitarian, ethnocentric and racist leader.
Despite the logically and empirically compelling nature of this argument in 
support of two interlocking and inseparable types of knowledge, sociologist as 
we have seen, are expected by some to achieve the impossible and that is to 
study, research and teach sociology in general -  and the sociology of deviance in 
particular -  as if evaluative knowledge did not exist. In trying to accomplish the 
impossible, many if not most sociologists, try to ignore, devaluate or suppress 
the existence and inescapable relevance of evaluative knowledge. This of course 
cannot successfully be achieved as our every thought, word and deed is preceded 
by and intended to satisfy a particular evaluative standard, underlying that 
particular thought, word or deed. Instead then of confronting and integrating 
these two levels of knowledge in an accountable manner, most sociologists opt 
for the easier but inadequate response to this inescapable dilemma, by simply 
using the term deviant behaviour to refer to all kinds of behaviour considered to 
be undesirable -  i.e. behaviour which would otherwise have been called bad or 
evil by whoever happens to be the selected definitional authority at the time, be 
it public opinion, the people, the workers, the government, the middle class, 
business, society etc.
Furthermore, they tend simply to substitute the term conformity for behaviour 
that would otherwise be called good or right by a similarly selected definitional 
authority. Implicitly then deviant behaviour becomes a synonym for bad/evil 
behaviour and comforming behaviour a synonym for good/right behaviour.
Our evaluative capacity as human beings thus poses an uncomfortable challenge 
to us which is in fact perceived by some to be some sort of threat from which 
one should rather try to escape. In terms of the above, three escape routes can 
thus be identified.
The first way of “escaping” our evaluative capability is therefore to avoid using 
the terms “good” and “evil” or “right” and “wrong” at all and to substitute these 
with terms like “conforming” and “deviant behaviour” respectively -  i.e. to opt 
for “ethically neutral objectivity”. Yet, as we have seen, we still end up with the 
problem that not all deviant behaviour can always be considered “bad” or “evil” . 
Many sociologists, however, evade this problem by denying the possibility of 
“good” deviant behaviour by calling such a possibilty an “oxymoron”. Thio 
(1995:5) refers to Sagarin in this regard: “Sagarin also insists that deviance be 
defined as negative only, arguing that it is an oxymoron -  a contradiction in 
terms -  to talk about ‘positive deviance’”. William Rushing basically shares the 
same conviction (in Thio, 1995:5).
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The logical problem that we are left with in using our substitutionary terms, is 
the following: How can good behaviour (i.e. conformity) at the same time also 
be bad and how can bad behaviour (i.e. deviance) at the same time also be good?
With twisted, relativistic reasoning, we could of course deceive ourselves to 
believe that what is considered “good” in our society might be considered “bad 
or evil” in the next and therefore that the same phenomenon could 
simultaneously be both good and bad. Yet deep inside, we would know that in 
terms of some ultimate criterion it is impossible for wrong to be really right and 
for right to be really wrong -  that it is impossible for two opposite and mutually 
exclusive phenomena to be the same and to be grouped together in the same 
nominal category.
In spite of this, our second route of escape then, is taken to be relativism. In this 
case we deny the reality and even possibility that absolutes concerning good and 
evil exist or could ever exist. Once we truly believe this, we conclude that it is 
not only impossible but also not rational or desirable to bother about issues like 
these. The behavioural directive following from this line of argument is simply 
“Do as you please -  as there are no evaluative absolutes on right and wrong 
anyway: therefore anything goes”.
Our third route o f escape is determinism. In this case the source of our actions is 
shifted from the realm of conscious and voluntary choice to dynamisms 
(structures/processes/forces) within ourselves or outside ourselves or at least 
outside our control. The old nature vs. nurture debate testifies to this. Through 
this approach then, we shift responsibility or blame for our actions or inaction to 
forces within or outside ourselves and in so doing we furthermore present these 
dynamisms as coercive entities which allow us no choice in what we do, no 
control over what we do and finally, as a result o f the first two, no responsibility 
fo r  what we do. Thus, once again no one could ever point a finger to us (or to 
any other human being for that matter) and say: “You’re responsible”.
Lyman (1978:119) notes in this regard:
The rise and proliferation of the sciences of man since the 1850’s have been 
attended by tiie fall and the contraction of the idea of sin. Perhaps most 
significant in this movement has been the philosophical victory in the minds of 
most educated persons, of determinism over freedom. Once man was relieved 
of full responsibility for his deeds, once dark forces of the mind, of history, of 
heredity, or of culture were found to shape his thoughts, and shackle his 
reason, sin with its insistence on freedom of the will to choose between good 
and evil, had to retreat into the recesses of a suspect theology; at the same time 
dire punishment as a deserved retribution for the willful commission of 
wrongful deeds had to give way to remediation and rehabilitation. The 
establishment of social-scientific determinism paved the way first for a 
scientific authorization for the distrust of human reason and, ultimately, for the 
triumph of the therapeutic.
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All of the above relieves us of the necessity to find ultimate and valid definitions 
of good and evil, to choose between the two and to accept responsibility for our 
choices.
The threats and possible escape routes could be depicted as follows:
Threat Escape route
Having to find ultimate and valid 
definitions of good and evil: Our 
definitional responsibility
Ethical neutrality
Having to choose between good 
and evil: Our decisional 
responsibility
Relativism
Having to accept accountability for 
our choices and actions: Our 
admissional responsibilty
Determinism
The same escapist dynamic operates within the study of deviance with ethical 
neutrality, relativism and determinism as the most well-known routes of escape 
from evaluative responsibility. In spite of this attempt to dodge the evaluative 
substructure upon which this whole operation rests, it will not go away and will 
keep on demanding a verdict even if only by default.
3.2 Defining deviance
When trying to define deviance, we can start off by looking at various categories 
of definitions as identified by Thio (1995:4-8).
Firstly he looks at definitions suggesting that deviance involves departure from  
normative standards. Parsons, Merton and Cohen fall in this category.
Secondly, those definitions -  used by most sociologists -  which define deviance 
in terms of what the public/public opinion considers negative, objectionable 
behaviour. Sociologists opting for these definitions, reject the idea that the term 
deviance could refer to positive of unobjectionable behaviour. Definitions by 
Rushing and Sagarin fall in this category.
Whereas the first two categories defined deviance on the basis of the actions of 
the deviant actor, the third category of definitions define deviance on the basis 
of a responding audience/group/society imposing a label on behaviour 
considered to be undesirable. Becker and Erikson fall in this category.
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The fourth category can be called the ambiguous category and involves 
ambiguous definitions. Matza and Lemert belong to this category. In fact Lemert 
suggests it is much better to leave deviance undefined.
Fifthly and finally, Alexander Liazos suggests that people listed by sociologists 
as deviant, have one thing in common. They are all oppressed, powerless 
individuals whose deviant behaviour is of a dramatic nature -  such as 
prostitution, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, and the like. This means that 
sociologists have neglected to study the powerful persons who break laws, fix 
laws, violate moral standards (in Thio, 1995:7).
Thio (1995:8), then reduces these five broad categories o f definitions into two -  
the positivist (including those definitions with a specific focus on definitional 
precision and a scientific study of powerless deviants) and the humanist 
(including definitions with a specific focus on broader boundaries, labeling and 
the study o f  powerful deviants).
Looking at the variety o f definitions of deviant behaviour, one common element 
connects all these definitions: In each and every definition, humans are taken as 
ultimate definitional authority -  be they sociologists, public opinion, powerful 
members o f society etc. Taking this fact as basis, it is possible to define 
deviance as that state o f  being and those behaviours which would constitute a 
departure from  that which humans (be it humanity in its totality or certain 
sections o f it) call "good". Put in other words therefore, deviance simply refers 
to that state o f  being or to that behaviour which humans call “bad " or "evil
4. On sin
4.1 Sin and sociology
Concerning sin  and so c io lo g y , Lym an (1 9 7 8 :3 ) says the follow ing:
To the extent that sociological thought embraces the study of evil today, it does 
so under the embarrassing, neutered morality of ‘deviance’. Adopting for the 
most part an uncritical stance toward the normative structure of any given 
society, the sociologist of deviance can only locate those violations of the 
norms that evoke sanctions of one kind or another. Presuming to have no 
relevant standards of morality by which he might independently judge the 
situation, the positive sociologist of deviance takes his cue from whatever the 
forces of law and restriction define as evil. Hence, the concerns of the vocal 
and powerful elements of a society become the resources for a sociological 
investigation of evil. Alternatively, the sociologist becomes the self-appointed 
advocate of an allegedly oppressed group, or of history itself, and seeks to 
define and locate evil in just those official elements that move against and 
demoralize his chosen people or trajectory of history. Sociologists are asked to 
take sides in a kind of intellectual contest of moral and social superiority; in the 
outcome of that game, there will emerge good and evil.
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A  good  exam ple o f  this is the book by Finsterbusch and M cK enna: Taking Sides 
(1986).
W ith reference to sin and so c io lo g y , Lym an (1 9 7 8 :3 -4 ) says:
The concept of sin is a rara avis in sociology1. Indeed, it is a rare word these 
days altogether if we except the thundering warnings of religion. It is not that 
there are no transgressions for which we might atone or repent, but rather that 
the atomization of society, the alienation characteristic of social relationship, 
the collectivization of guilt and pride make the designation of sinners all too 
difficult. There has been a division of labour in sin as well as in virtue, and 
each person can now point an accusatory finger toward others or toward a 
faceless massive monolith -  the corporate structure of modem society. It is 
precisely in this recognition of division, corporatism, and neutrality that sin has 
reached its greatest heights. For modem sin is peculiarly non-human in its use 
of things and exploitative in its use of men. Just as man reaches new 
understandings of human nature and social order, those very understandings 
lead him to see evil as outside his control. It is the Frankensteinian vision that 
haunts the world today. Man has created great corporate automatons, 
empowered them with money, endowed them with strength and potency, and 
freed them from personal, social, or moral responsibility. Once imagined to be 
his neutral servants, who would keep him from the temptations of pride, 
avarice, envy, and gluttony, coerce him away from sloth, reduce and cabin his 
lust, and chasten his anger, these corporate men manqué have become his 
masters, driving him on, determined to achieve in their soulless domination a 
hitherto unimagined kind of tyranny. They have appropriated and neutralized 
sin, liberating men from their obligations to one another at the precise moment 
when these same men become slaves to their own immortal and untiring 
creations.
From the preceding section it is clear that, as Cherbonnier (1956:28) concludes: 
“ .... the true realist is the man who acknowledges the distinction between good 
and evil and with it the category of sin”.
Looking at humanity and human life across the boundaries of time and space 
and as we know it today in the here and now, one conclusion is inescapable. 
Something went terribly wrong somewhere. One needs not be a genius to come 
to this conclusion, as the empirical evidence is overwhelming. Not only do we 
observe the manifestation of the micro- en macrodynamics of destruction and 
degeneration in the physical-geographical, psycho-biological, socio-cultural and 
spiritual realms but sooner or later all of us personally experience the ravages of 
the destructive dynamic that relentlessly gnaws away at the very fibre of life and 
orderly substance in all its forms. Earthquakes, droughts, floods, environmental
1 An important exception is Edward Alsworth Ross's Sin and Society: An Analysis o f  Latter Day 
Iniquity ( 1973).
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abuse, mental and physical illness in all its forms, marital and family 
disintegration, violence, rape and murder, poverty, corruption, domination of 
one individual or group by another individual or group be it ethnic, racial, 
gender, class or international domination, conflict or war and finally, the 
invisible but very real war that rages between Truth and Lie in the battlefield of 
the spiritual realm where ideas, words and philosophies of truth and deception 
vie for our attention and support, confirm and underline the fact that everything 
is not well. There seems to be a relentless and ultimate death-directness inherent 
in all of humankind’s thoughts, words and actions as well as in the dynamics 
that operate within and drive nature and the greater cosmos.
All of this o f course started when “ ... the first human couple disobeyed God and 
fe ll victim to sin ...” Ever since his condition has been typified as a state of 
decay and sin (status corruptions) (Móller, 1997:2).
In this regard Lyman (1978:269) states "... man seems to be overwhelmed by 
evil and yet obscured from sin”. The unpleasant realities associated with human 
existence carrying the stamp of death, pose questions like: “What has gone 
wrong in the world?” and “What is wrong with humanity -  why all the hatred, 
fighting, killing, sorrow, pain, struggling to survive”, “Why all the injustice?” 
“Why did my child/spouse/father/mother have to die such an agonizing death?” 
These questions demand answers.
Human explanations of these realities and answers to these questions remain 
unsatisfactory and incomplete. Lyman (1978:273), with reference to present-day 
society and sin, states:
... the scenes of sin are now much more different from those imagined by the 
early thinkers on the subject. Three moods or leitmotivs dominate the modem 
dramas of sin and evil -  immensity, impersonality and ambiguity. The scale of 
evil committed in the world today seems to defy puny man’s attempt to 
understand, much less to prevent it.
God’s explanation of and word for this tragic state of human affairs, is of course 
“sin” and the consequences of sin. These and other empirical realities o f human 
existence confirm the ontological reality of sin and its consequences.
The overwhelming and depressing force of the gravity of sin is such that, unless 
this burden is placed on the shoulders of Jesus Christ, who already carried this 
burden on our behalf and absolved us from its bondage, alternative escape routes 
have to be identified and used especially for the sake of mental and spiritual 
survival.
4.2 The denial of sin
Being confronted by the ontological reality and horror of sin and its death- 
directed, degenerative dynamic, without knowing and/or acknowledging Jesus
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Christ as the Way, the Truth and the Life out of this existential death-warrant, 
the denial o f sin, as an attempt to escape the reality and consequences thereof, 
this becomes imperative. Lyman (1978:271-272) describes this tendency as 
follows:
... As the anxieties of life itself become too much to bear, individuals seek an 
escape from evil, a release from sin, virtually a departure from the human 
condition. In their heroic struggle to release themselves from the captivity of 
sinful life they exchange one form of life for another, each new form promising 
both liberation and security, the end of man’s separation from himself, from 
God, from history. Harold Rosenberg is thus quite correct when he inteiprets 
Marx’s theory of history as a great theatrical drama. It is a play that unfolds in 
five mammoth, era-long acts -  Asiatic, Ancient, Feudal, Bourgeois, and 
Socialist Production. In terms of Simmel’s theory of the dialectics of form and 
life, each epoch is an act in the drama of mankind’s release from the formal 
conditions of human enslavement and its ultimate emergence into an existence 
that is life itself, freed from all forms. But the forms are man’s own 
contribution to life -  he gives it structure, meaning, rules, and customs. 
Encased in his own creations, architectonic man cannot escape. He can only 
hope for release.
In this process of denying sin yet having to face and struggle with its 
consequences, especially the social sciences tends to be seen and presented as a 
substitute, but false gospel to the world.
Guilt must somehow be sublimated. “The task of social theory is not to explain 
guilt away or absorb it unthinkingly in still another destructive ideology, but to 
neutralize it and give it expression in truly creating and life-enhancing 
ideologies”. Becker believed that a new science of society -  synthesizing ideas 
of Marx with those of Freud -  might in its critical and tragic dimensions provide 
a moral equivalent of religion for the expiation of sin. “A science of society”, he 
wrote, “will be a study similar to one envisaged by Old Testament prophets, 
Augustine, Kierkegaard, Max Scheler, William Hocking: it will be a critique of 
idolatry, of the costs of a too narrow focus for the dramatization of man’s need 
for power and expiation” (Lyman, 1978:271-272).
Schuurman (1993:356) sees the denial of sin as the consequence of the denial of 
God as the creator of reality: “Men erkent de werkelijheid niet langer als 
schepping van God, laat staan dat men de diepte van de zondeval en daarmee 
ook de totale en radikale verlossing deur Christus en de verwachting van de 
herschepping belijdt”.
With its inclination to determinism and ethical neutrality then, the social 
sciences in general and sociology in particular tend to act as substitute gospel in 
the mind o f  the unbeliever by declaring, through its philosophies, theories and 
research, the innocence and guilt-free state of humanity and implicitly 
presenting science in general and social science in particular as the way to
Koers 64(4) 1999:443-464 457
When deviance becomes sin
redemption from the bondage of sin and its consequences. It is exactly this 
quality of the social sciences which affords it its almost irresistible attraction for 
the world.
4.3 Defining sin
What then does this phenomenon called “sin ” entail?
Cherbonnier (1956:43-44) starts off by stating that the concept o f sin is not 
exclusive to Christianity:
The word ‘s inthen,  a purely formal word referring to the disorientation of 
human freedom, is no monopoly o f Christianity. Every philosophy has its own 
conception of what man’s external point of reference ought to be. Consequent­
ly, as the other side of the coin, it will also have its own conception of sin, 
though usually under a different name. The reason why it is mistakenly 
regarded as a ‘Christian motif is simply that the Bible, adhering more 
rigorously than most other philosophies to the implications of human freedom, 
keeps the problem of sin in the foreground, instead of trying to circumvent it. 
Until one realizes that the issues with which it deals are the issues of human 
life, one will scarcely be interested in its specific answer to a question one has 
never faced. Conversely, when a man does awake to the fact that the discovery 
of the true God is a matter of life and death, he can hardly afford to ignore 
words like these. [He then refers to Ezekiel (14:7, 8, 11).] The distinctively 
biblical conception of sin thus depends upon the biblical conception of God 
and the effect, which he exerts upon his worshipers.
“The words ‘sin’ and idolatry only become specifically Christian with the 
biblical answer to the question: ‘Which is the true version o f  sin or idolatry’? 
And this in turn depends on the prior question, ‘Which (or who) is the true 
God?’” (Cherbonnier, 1956:42).
Cherbonnier (1956:61, 68) indicates that sin has been misconceived in two 
ways: Firstly as breaking rules and secondly as being intrinsic to human nature. 
The first misconception implies God to be involved in the "... quibbling 
calculation of quid pro quo” and implies that God’s love is for sale (1956:62) 
and this is contrary to God’s revealed nature.
The second misconception, which also implies the concept of “original sin” 
suggest an element of determinism in human’s sinful behaviour which is 
contrary to the biblical conception that humans are free to choose. This 
conception, however, understands that sin is prior to individual acts of choice, 
and traces it to a defective human nature rather than to misplaced allegiance” 
(Cherbonnier, 1856:85).
Cherbonnier (1956:13) says that
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If there is any viable alternative to it, the Christian doctrine of sin ought not to 
be taken seriously. Its consequences are far too momentous to warrant 
acceptance on any but the most unimpeachable grounds. The most obvious 
alternative is to deny that the conception of sin in any form, whether Christian 
or otherwise, is a meaningful or necessary category for the interpretation of 
human life. As against this view, the present book must demonstrate that some 
notion of sin, even though under a different label, is integral to the thinking of 
every human being. He who denies it ultimately succeeds only in concealing it 
from himself.
The other alternative to the Christian view would indeed retain the conception 
of sin but with a different definition. Historically all such definitions have 
fallen under one of two main headings: the moralistic view, which regards sin 
as the violation of given rules and standards; and the dismal conception of sin 
as some intrinsic defect in human nature. The book must therefore also refute 
these versions of sin before vindicating the specifically biblical view.
This is exactly what Cherbonnier does in his book, refuting the conception of sin 
as either merely a matter of breaking rules or merely intrinsic to human nature in 
the deterministic sense of the word. Cherbonnier (1956:13) then goes on to 
define sin with reference to the Bible in the following words:
According to the Bible, sin is properly defined as misplaced allegiance or, to 
use its technical word for it, idolatry. No man is without his ‘god’, in the sense 
of a focal point around which his life takes its orbit and which imparts a 
distinctive complexion to his values, purposes, and actions.
Móller (1997: 8-10) also discusses the meaning of sin as presented in the Bible 
and highlights the following characteristics:
• Sin as not reaching the goal -  missing God’s purpose for humanity.
• Sin as trespassing the limits imposed by God and rebellion by refusing to live 
in accordance with God’s commandments.
• Sin as evil, especially the evil inclination that exists in man.
•  Iniquity or lawlessness by living outside the law of God (Greek: anomia 
Matt. 7:23).
• Being guilty before God.
•  P e rfid y  an d  d islo y a lty .
• Works of the flesh.
•  Manifesting the spirit of the devil in the world.
•  Crucifying the Son of God.
Berkouwer (1960:58) states that sin can only be defined in relation and with 
reference to God in the sense that sin in its deepest sense involves an 
unfathomable depth of wrong against God. Referring to the essential being of
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sin, he lists the following: “val, ongehoorzaamheid, ontrouw, vijandskap, onge- 
loof, overtreding, vervreemding”.
Lyman (1978:271) defines sin as follows:
Sin from this point of view is the human condition, the condition of alienation 
from God. In his separation from the divine he feels uncertain of his being and 
unknowing of his future. The material and fleshly world obsesses him, but he 
gains no peace of mind thereby. It is life itself that becomes a problem, and not 
merely particular acts in that life. Sin thus creates a drama of lifelong anxiety, 
as lonely, oppressed, and weighted-down individuals act or are acted upon in a 
theater of increasing absurdity.
Ellul (1985:60), with reference to sin, says the following:
. . . in truly Christian thought, sin is known and recognized for what it is only 
after the recognition, proclamation, and experience of forgiveness. Because I 
have been pardoned, I realize how much of a sinner 1 was. Sin is shown to be 
sin through grace and not otherwise, just as the abruptly freed slave realizes, as 
he sees his chains, how great his misery was.
Sin for the purposes of this article then will be conceived of as being two­
dimensional:
First o f all it will be conceived of as being intrinsic to human nature i.e. as being 
a natural inclination or predisposition to deny and therefore disobey God and to 
hate one’s neighbour. What is suggested here is simply that the first, 
spontaneous, natural option which comes to mind in a situation of invitation to 
sin, is to establish the supremacy o f  se lf which rebels against God and God's 
laws. This would involve what the Bible calls our carnal nature (Rom. 8:6-8). 
For instance, no father needs to call his son of five years old to himself, lift him 
onto his lap and say: ‘Son, today Daddy’s going to teach you how to lie!’ The 
boy already knows how to lie without needing anybody to teach him. He has 
been bom with the inclination towards and the knowledge of how to lie and 
needs to be taught the better alternative. Adults o f course are more adept in 
hiding or camouflaging this inclination or tendency. In essence, this involves an 
inclination towards that which God would call evil or would disapprove of in 
that particular situation.
In terms of what Cherbonnier suggested, the tendency towards sin is seen here as 
the outflow or consequence of a defective human nature which in turn is seen 
here as being a result o f Adam and Eve’s original sin. This, however, in no way 
implies that the resultant sinful behaviour which might or might not flow from  
this inclination or tendency, is blindly determined as i f  humans had no choice or 
decisional responsibility, but merely that this is the response that, due to its 
intrinsic nature, tends to be the primary and natural or first option considered in 
a particular situation, e.g. to hate those who hate you or to love those who love
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you to lie rather than speak the truth, etc. It needs to be stressed, however, that 
consideration and freedom of choice -  in other words our decisional 
responsibility -  always and inescapably stands between our natural tendency or 
inclination towards sin and the actual commitment o f sin.
The second dimension of sin then would involve a free choice, or the executing 
o f one’s decisional responsibility, to act according to our carnal or sinful 
tendencies or inclination -  i.e. out of free will and consciously, to do exactly that 
which God would call evil or would disapprove o f
Sin then can be a defined as that state of being and those forms of behaviour 
which constitute a departure from that which God calls good or stated otherwise, 
conformity to that which God calls evil/wrong or bad. Sin furthermore is totally 
race-, gender-, and class-blind and refuses to be bound or limited by any 
sociological variable or category.
5. On the relationship between sin and deviance
The relationship between sin and social deviance will very briefly be described 
in terms of a typology in which sin has been defined as that state o f being and 
those forms o f behaviour which departs from that which God calls good or 
conforms to that which God calls evil/wrong or bad.
Deviance on the other hand has been defined as that state o f  being and those 
forms o f behaviour which depart from that which humans -  or certain sections 
o f humanity -  call good or conforms to that which humans or certain sections o f 
humanity call evil/wrong or bad.
The relationship between sin and social deviance will now very briefly be 
outlined by drawing up a simple typology in which human definitions of good 
and evil will be combined with God’s definitions of good and evil. The typology 
looks like this:
God’s definitions o f
Good Evil
Good G G GE
Human definitions o f Evil EG EE
From the typology above it is clear that four types of
discerned:
•  GG: Behaviour that conforms to what both God and humans would call good 
and involves human obedience to God.
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•  GE: Behaviour that humans would call good but that God would call evil and 
involves obedience to humans but disobedience to God.
•  EG. Behaviour that humans would call evil but God would call good and 
involves disobedience to humans but obedience to God. This constitutes an 
interesting category o f  behaviour as it includes what has previously been 
called good deviant behaviour but the possibility o f  which is denied by som e 
sociologists. This is perhaqps the most challenging and difficult kind o f  
behaviour required from Christians as it very often involves standing alone in 
a self-sacrificial way. This is exactly the kind o f  behaviour that Christ Jesus 
exem plified.
•  EE. Behaviour that both humans and God would call evil and involves 
disobedience to both humans and God.
The relationship could further be clarified by means o f  two overlapping circles, 
the one circle representing sin, the other representing deviance. In terms o f  two 
overlapping circles it is clear that three categories o f  behaviour can be 
distinguished:
•  Behaviour considered sin from G od’s perspective but not considered deviant 
from human perspective.
•  Behaviour considered deviant from human perspective but not considered to 
be sin from G od’s perspective. Looking at Scripture, this seem s to be the 
kind o f  behaviour God encourages in His children by calling on them to 
depart from that which is wrong and evil -  thus to be G odly deviants!
•  Finally a category o f  behavioural overlap between sin and deviance which 
could therefore be considered to be both sinful and deviant.
6. Conclusion
By accepting God as the Ultimate Definitional Authority not only in our lives 
but also in the study o f  social deviance, w e are -  in terms o f  the logovision 
premise -  enabled to gain the follow ing advantages:
•  First o f  all w e  w ill be enabled to see reality as it really is, i.e. to distinguish 
the true good from the false good and true evil from false evil and thus avoid 
the pitfall o f  acting in a fatally inappropriate manner in a world full o f  
deceptive definitions o f  what constitutes good and what constitutes evil. This 
would also bring an interesting and exciting dim ension into the study o f  
deviance as evaluative issues would not need to be avoided but could be 
confronted in a bold and constructive way in both teaching and research.
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•  We would be able to clearly distinguish good deviant behaviour from bad or 
evil deviant behaviour. In terms of the typology, the latter would include 
behaviour that both God and humans would call evil and behaviour that 
humans would call good but God would call evil.
• Though the phenomenon of definitions of good and evil being relative to a 
particular time and place would remain, the problem of evaluative relativism 
and the evaluative confusion accompanying this relativism, would disappear 
as God is taken as Ultimate Definitional Authority concerning inter alia 
definitional issues of good and evil/ good and bad/ right and wrong and God 
in and through Jesus Christ would thus become The Absolute One relative to 
whom else is measured.
• We would realize that deviance (of the variety which humans would call evil 
but God would call good) can indeed be a very good form of deviance that 
should be encouraged.
•  Ethical neutrality -  chosen because of the fear to boldly confront issues of 
right and wrong -  could be replaced by agape love (love in spite of) in the 
approach towards and study of deviants. Thus love could become the guiding 
principle in the study of and in dealing with all issues of good and evil and 
eventually could become the “ . .. concentration o f all normativity” (Schuur- 
man, 1993:353).
•  The study o f  deviance could be performed with evaluative and intellectual 
integrity in the sense o f  calling good “good” and evil “evil” instead o f  vice  
versa and doing that without apology.
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